Abstract. In this work, relations between the security notions standard simulatability and universal simulatability for cryptographic protocols are investigated. A simulatability-based notion of security considers a protocol π as secure as an idealization τ of the protocol task, if and only if every attack on π can be simulated by an attack on τ . Two formalizations, which both provide secure composition of protocols, are common: standard simulatability means that for every π-attack and protocol user H, there is a τ -attack, such that H cannot distinguish π from τ . Universal simulatability means that for every π-attack, there is a τ -attack, such that no protocol user H can distinguish π from τ . Trivially, universal simulatability implies standard simulatability. We show: the converse is true with respect to perfect security, but not with respect to computational or statistical security. Besides, we give a formal definition of a time-lock puzzle, which may be of independent interest. Although the described results do not depend on any computational assumption, we show that the existence of a timelock puzzle gives an even stronger separation of standard and universal simulatability with respect to computational security.
Introduction
Recently, simulatability-based characterizations of security for cryptographic protocols received a lot of attention. In particular, several modelings of multiparty computation have been presented which allow for secure composition of protocols, cf. [PW00,Can00,PW01, Can01, BPW04b] . All these models share the idea of simulatability: a protocol is considered secure only relative to another protocol. That is, a protocol π is as secure as another protocol τ (usually an idealization of the respective protocol task), if every attack on π can be simulated by an attack on τ .
A little more formally, this means that for every adversary A π attacking π, there is an adversary A τ (sometimes referred to as the simulator) that attacks τ , such that from an outside view, both attacks and protocols "look the same." There are different interpretations of what "looking the same" means concretely.
Roughly, the interpretation of [Can01] is the following: π is as secure as τ , iff for every A π , there is an A τ such that no protocol user H (this entity is called the environment Z in [Can01] ) is able to distinguish running with π and A π from running with τ and A τ .
Although [PW00, PW01, BPW04b] provide this criterion as "universal simulatability," the default notion of security in these works is that of "standard simulatability." Roughly, standard simulatability demands that for every A π and every protocol user H, there is an A τ such that H cannot distinguish π and A π from τ and A τ . So basically, the difference between these notions is that with standard simulatability, the simulator A τ may depend on the user H, whereas universal simulatability requests the existence of "user-universal" simulators A τ .
All presently known proofs (e.g., in [Can01, BPW04a] ) that one can securely compose a polynomial number of concurrent protocols depend on the fact that the honest user/environment is chosen in dependence of the simulator. Consequently, we do not know how to prove such a composition theorem in the case of standard security.
Our Results
In this contribution, we study the relation between standard and universal simulatability. Therefore, we focus on the modeling of [BPW04b] , which provides both flavors of simulatability. For a relation to the framework [Can01, CLOS02] of universal composability, see Section 1.2.
By definition, universal simulatability implies standard simulatability. We show that even the converse is true when requiring perfect security (i.e., equality of user-views in the definitions). Apart from giving structural insights, this result may be of practical interest: especially when dealing with idealized protocols, often perfect simulatability can be achieved. Our result enables to conduct a (potentially easier) proof of standard simulatability, and then to conclude universal simulatability using Theorem 1.
On the other hand, we can show that standard simulatability does not imply universal simulatability with respect to statistical or computational security. For this, we construct a protocol which is secure only with respect to standard simulatability (in the statistical or computational case). This result shows that proofs of universal simulatability can be stronger than proofs of standard simulatability.
Unfortunately, the constructed protocol is not strictly polynomial-time. So in the computational case, one may wish to have a stronger separation by means of a strictly polynomial-time protocol. We provide such a protocol, and prove that it separates standard and universal simulatability in the computational case. As a technical tool, we need the computational assumption of time-lock puzzles, cf. [RSW96] . So additionally, we provide a formal definition of a time-lock puzzle, which may be of independent interest.
Connections to Universal Composability
Although the framework [Can01, CLOS02] of Universal Composability (UC) does not directly provide an equivalent to the notion of standard simulatability, a formulation of standard simulatability there would seem straightforward. As our proofs below do not depend on specific model characteristics, we believe that our proofs can then be adapted to that framework; this would show that standard and universal simulatability can be separated there, too.
However, recently we have been told [Can04] by Ran Canetti, that in a slightly modified UC setting with a different formulation of polynomial-time, the two notions coincide. At a closer look, this is no contradiction to our results. Namely, Canetti proposes a different notion of standard simulatability than used in, e.g., [BPW04b] : in Canetti's formulation, the environment 1 has a runtime bounded polynomially in the length of its auxiliary input, which again is chosen in dependence of the simulator. So effectively, the (polynomial) runtime bound of the environment is chosen after the simulator, whence our proofs do not apply in that case.
However, since we show that our separating examples also hold for the case of honest users H with non-uniform auxiliary input (that does not affect H's runtime), they should be applicable to the notion of "Specialized-simulator UC" 2 defined in [Lin03] .
Organisation
Section 2 establishes the equality of standard and universal simulatability for the case of perfect security; in Section 3, a separation of these notions for statistical and computational security is presented. The discussed stronger separation by means of a strictly polynomial-time protocol using time-lock puzzles is investigated in Section 4. This work ends with a conclusion in Section 5. In Appendix A, we briefly review the modeling of [BPW04b] .
The Perfect Case
We start by relating standard and universal simulatability for the case of perfect security. Perfect security demands that the respective user-views in the compared protocol situations are completely equal. We show that with respect to perfect security, standard and universal simulatability are equivalent notions. For this, we only need to show that standard simulatability already implies universal simulatability-the other direction is trivial from the definitions.
The idea of our proof is to construct a "universal" protocol user H u , that simply chooses all of its outputs at random, such that any finite sequence of outputs occurs with nonzero probability. In a sense, H u incorporates all possible protocol users H. Now standard simulatability implies that there is a simulator which is "good" with respect to this user H u . But informally, anything H could do will be done by H u with nonzero probability. Since H u 's views are completely identical in both protocols, this allows to conclude that this simulator is not only "good" with respect to H u , but with respect to all possible users H. Theorem 1. With respect to perfect security, standard simulatability implies universal simulatability.
Proof. As a prerequisite, let D be a probability distribution over Σ * which satisfies Pr [s ← D] > 0 for all s ∈ Σ * . (As in [PW01, BPW04b] , Σ denotes the (finite) message alphabet over which messages sent by machines are formed.) Such a D necessarily exists, since Σ * is countable. Let (M 1 , S) and (M 2 , S) be structures with (
That is, let H, A 1 be a valid pair of user and adversary for protocolM 1 . Without loss of generality, we assume H to have exactly one self-clocked self-connection (i.e., a connection from H to itself) with name loop, and to have its ports ordered lexicographically.
3 Then the sequence of ports of H only depends on A 1 .
Let H u be a machine with the same port sequence as H, but with a state set Σ * and initial states {1} * . H u 's transition function makes H u switch as follows: independent of state and input, H u 's next state and all of its outputs, including outputs on clock ports, are drawn (independently) from D.
Intuitively, H u is universal in the following sense: for a fixed A 1 , H u is independent of H. H u 's construction guarantees that every finite prefix of H u -outputs and -states has non-zero probability.
Clearly we have (
, which means that H u , A 1 is a valid pair of user and adversary for protocolM 1 . Then the standard security (M 1 , S) ≥ perf sec (M 2 , S) which we assumed ensures the existence of an A 2 with view (M1,S,Hu,A1) (H u ) = view (M2,S,Hu,A2) (H u ).
(1)
We will show
which suffices to prove (M 1 , S) ≥ uni,perf sec (M 2 , S), since A 2 does not depend on H.
So let k ∈ AE be an arbitrary security parameter. 4 The following notation for views of H in protocol runs with A 1 andM 1 , resp. A 2 andM 2 will simplify the presentation: let tr u for views of H u . For n ∈ AE, let (tr ) n denote the n-th step in a view tr ; (tr) 1..n is the n-step prefix of tr. When it is clear that I ∈ Σ * is a vector of inputs, we write I ∈ st to denote the event that in a step st, the machine input vector is I.
We prove the following two statements simultaneously by induction over n ∈ AE:
A(0) and B(0) hold trivially. So assume that A(n) and B(n) hold. Let an arbitrary (n + 1)-step prefix (st) 1..n+1 with α := Pr tr
be given. To show A(n + 1), it suffices to prove Pr tr
To see (4), we first remark that for the machine input vector I n+1 in (st) n+1 , (1) implies
Here we also need B(n) to be sure that the probabilities of the conditions are not only equal, but also positive. Furthermore, we have for i ∈ {1, 2}:
because the distribution on the next user-inputs is completely determined by the history over all preceding user-outputs. The probabilities for the conditions are positive by (3), A(n), and the construction of H u . From here, B(n + 1) follows from the construction of H u . We continue proving A(n + 1). Combining (5) and (6) yields
But since input and current state already determine the distribution on outputs and next states, we have Pr tr
Because the probabilities for the respective conditions in (7) are positive and equal by A(n) and 3, this shows (4), and thus A(n + 1). Summarising, A(n) holds for all n, which in particular implies (2), and thus shows the theorem.
⊓ ⊔ This proof idea does not work in the computational or statistical case. Very informally, H u behaves like a given user H too seldom; the resulting success to distinguish protocols would be much smaller than that of H.
So one may ask whether Theorem 1 also holds for computational or statistical security. The next section shows that this is not the case.
The Statistical and the Computational Case
Recall that simulatability with respect to statistical security demands that polynomial prefixes of the user-views in the real, resp. ideal model must be of "small" statistical distance. Here, "small" may denote a negligible or even exponentially small function in k. The following proof deals with negligible functions as those "small" functions. However, the proof carries over to other classes of "small" functions.
On the other hand, for simulatability with respect to computational security, users and adversaries are restricted to (strict) polynomial-time. In this case, the user-views in the real, resp. ideal model only need to be computationally indistinguishable.
Here we give a real and an ideal protocol such that the real protocol is as secure as the ideal one with respect to standard simulatability, but not with respect to universal simulatability. Roughly, the ideal protocol asks adversary and user for bitstrings and then outputs who of them gave the longest bitstring. The real protocol does the same, but always outputs "adversary".
A successful simulator must hence be able to give a longer input than the user with overwhelming probability. We show that such a simulator exists for any given user; we also show that there can be no such simulator which gives longer inputs than every user.
Theorem 2. With respect to computational and statistical security, standard simulatability does not imply universal simulatability. This holds also if we allow non-uniform polynomial-time honest users for the case of computational security.
Proof. Let (M 1 , S) be a structure with machinesM 1 = {M 1 } and service ports S, where S c = {user!, user ⊳ !, out?}. The machine M 1 is depicted in Figure 1 . M 1 waits for an input h on port user?, and an input a on port adv?; only the first respective input is considered. When having received both such inputs h and a, M 1 outputs and clocks the value b = 0 on out!.
Let (M 2 , S) be a structure withM 2 = {M 2 }. The machine M 2 is identical to M 1 , except that the value b that is eventually output on out! is determined as b = 1 if |h| > |a|, and b = 0 otherwise. So intuitively, b = 1 (resp. b = 0) indicates that the user (resp. the simulator) delivered the longest bitstring. ? We claim (M 1 , S) ≥ NEGL sec (M 2 , S). So let a real configuration (M 1 , S, H, A 1 ) ∈ ConfM 2 (M 1 , S) be given. Denote by h k the random variable that describes M 1 's first user?-input in runs with security parameter k, or ⊥, if there is no user?-input. Since H and A 1 are fixed, there is a function f : AE → AE for which
Thus, let A 2 be the combination of A 1 and a special machine S, cf. which either h k = ⊥ or h k < f (k), then we get exactly the same distribution on H-views as in the real configuration. Using (8), we get
This implies in particular (
M 1 , S) ≥ NEGL sec (M 2 ,
S).
On the other hand, we claim (M 1 , S) ≥ uni,NEGL sec (M 2 , S). For this, consider the following real adversary A 1 , which is master scheduler and has an additional token connection to the honest user. In its first activation, A 1 outputs and clocks the value a
(1) = 1 on adv!. In its second activation, it activates H by outputting and clocking 1 on port token!.
Furthermore, for a function g : AE → AE, let H g be the machine which writes and clocks h = 1 g(k) onto out! in its first activation. The remaining ports of H g are chosen to close the collection {M 1 , H g , A 1 }.
We show that for every simulator A 2 , there is a function g for which H g distinguishes M 1 and A 1 from M 2 and A 2 . So let A 2 be a simulator for which (M 2 , S,
Denote by a (2) k the random variable that describes the first adv?-input that M 2 gets in runs with security parameter k, or ⊥, if there is no adv? input. Since A 2 is fixed, there is a function g for which
In the configuration (M 1 , S, H g , A 1 ), H's view in its second activation contains out?-input 0. But by (9), and since the distribution of a (2) k is independent of g, H g 's view in (M 2 , S, H g , A 2 ) contains out?-input 0 with only negligible probability. So (M 1 , S) ≥ uni,NEGL sec (M 2 , S), and the theorem follows for the statistical case.
The proof above carries over literally to the computational case (with respect to uniform as well as non-uniform honest users), because for polynomial-time H and A, there are polynomials f and g fulfilling (8) and (9).
⊓ ⊔
A Stronger Separation
The proof from the preceding section does not work, if we restrict to protocol machines (i.e., structures) that are strictly polynomial-time. Although the machines M 1 and M 2 used in the proof above are weakly polynomial-time (i.e., they are polynomial-time in the overall length of their inputs and the security parameter, cf. [BPW04b] ), at least M 2 needs to accept arbitrarily long inputs.
5
For a separation of the computational simulatability notions by means of strictly polynomial-time structures, we have to work a little harder. As a technical tool, we use time-lock puzzles (see [RSW96] ). -sufficiently hard puzzles: for every PPT-algorithm B and every e ∈ AE, there is some c ∈ AE with
negligible in k.
-sufficiently good solvers: there is some b ∈ AE such that for every d ∈ AE there is a PPT-algorithm C such that
is overwhelming in k.
Intuitively, G(1 k , t) generates a puzzle q of hardness t, and a description a of valid solutions for q. V(1 k , a, b) verifies if b is a valid solution as specified by a. First, we require that any given PPT-algorithm B can't solve sufficiently hard puzzles. Formally, we want B to be unable to solve puzzles which are of hardness t, t ≥ k c for some c depending on B. We add an auxiliary input h (of polynomial length) to prevent the following scenario: Bob (B) wants to show to Alice, that he is able to perform calculations of some hardness t, therefore he chooses t, and then Alice (G) chooses the puzzle. It is now imaginable, that Bob may choose some auxiliary information h and the hardness t simultaneously, s.t. using h one can solve time-lock puzzles of hardness t.
7 This is prevented by our definition, since (10) is negligible even in presence of polynomially length-bounded auxiliary inputs h. Second, we demand that for every polynomial hardness value, there is an algorithm C solving puzzles of this hardness. It is sensible here to ask for short solutions (i.e., |c| ≤ k b ): otherwise, the definition allows time-lock puzzles in which the solution of every t-hard puzzle is deterministically 1 t .
9
[RSW96] promotes the following family of puzzles as candidates for timelock puzzles. A puzzle of hardness t consists of the task to compute 2 2 t ′ mod n where t ′ := min{t, 2 k } and n = pq is a Blum integer. 10 In our notation, this is denoted by G(1
, where n is a random k-bit Blum integer with factorisation n = pq, and V(1 k , (p, q, t ′ ), c) = 1 if and
can be efficiently computed with knowledge of p and q.)
We return to the problem of separating standard and universal simulatability by means of strictly polynomial-time structures. The idea is very similar to the one used in the proof of Theorem 2. In the ideal setting, we let a machine M 2 check and output whether H has more "computational power" than the adversary A 2 . The corresponding real machine M 1 always outputs "no". Here we have standard simulatability, since A 2 can be chosen in dependence of H (and thus more powerful). On the other hand, the simulatability is not universal, since an A 2 -dependent user H can be chosen so powerful that M 2 outputs "yes". Now time-lock puzzles are exactly what M 2 needs to check the computational power of A 2 and H. Concretely, M 2 simply picks a puzzle for both A 2 and H and outputs "yes" if H is the only one to solve that puzzle. Our definition of time-lock 7 Imagine that, e.g., being able to find the pre-image of t under some function would already solve the puzzle. 8 Note that for the proof of Theorem 3, this additional constraint is not necessary. 9 In fact, using such a "degenerate" puzzle would yield a proof for Theorem 2, very similar to that given in Section 3. 10 One might wonder why our formulation uses t ′ = min{t, 2 k } instead of t (in contrast to the original formulation in [RSW96] ). It can be shown that for t := (2 k )! + 1 it is 2 puzzles guarantees that puzzles can be generated and solutions can be checked by a strictly polynomially bounded M 2 . An exact theorem statement and a proof follow:
Theorem 3. Assume that time-lock puzzles exist. Then for computational security, standard simulatability and universal simulatability can be separated by two strictly polynomial-time structures. This holds also if we allow non-uniform polynomial-time honest users.
Proof. First, let D denote a PPT-algorithm which, upon input 1 k , returns a uniformly chosen t from {2 1 , 2 2 , . . . , 2 k }. Let (G, V) be a time-lock puzzle. Let (M 1 , S) be a structure with machineŝ M 1 = {M 1 } and service ports S, where S c = {user!, user ⊳ !, puz user?, out?}. The machine M 1 is depicted in Figure 3 . All indicated connections (not counting the potential connections between A 1 and H) are clocked by the sending machine. Let (M 2 , S) be a structure with machinesM 2 = {M 2 }. The machine M 2 is identical to M 1 , except that the value b ∈ {0, 1} that is eventually output on out! is determined as an evaluation of the predicate v H ∧ ¬v A . Intuitively, b = 1 happens (i.e., H can distinguish) if and only if H is able to successfully solve harder puzzles than the adversary.
Note that by setting suitable length functions (i.e., l(user?) = l(adv?) = k b for the b ∈ AE from (11), M 1 and M 2 can be made polynomial-time. Let f (k) = k c for the c ∈ AE that arises from (10) for this B. Let C be the PPT-algorithm from (11) when setting d = c. So intuitively, C is able to solve (except with negligible error) any puzzle that H can solve. Similar to the construction of the simulator A 2 in the proof of Theorem 2 (cf. also Figure 2) , let S be a machine which places itself between A 1 and M 1 . A 1 's ports puz adv?, adv!, and adv ⊳ ! are renamed to puz adv?, adv!, and adv ⊳ !, respectively. Finally, A 2 is the combination of A 1 and this machine S. The idea of S is simple: Whenever A 1 sends a (possibly wrong) solution of a puzzle of hardness f (k) to M 2 , S solves the puzzle and sends a correct solution to M 2 . This will allow to show indistinguishability, since H will only notice that it runs with the ideal protocol if A 2 sends a wrong solution to M 2 for a puzzle H was able to solve.
More formally, S immediately forwards all messages from M 2 to A 2 . However, the first message q on adv puz is stored. When A 1 sends the second message to M 2 via adv, that message is replaced by a solution c ← C(1 k , q) and then forwarded to M 2 .
Using a suitable length function, S can be made polynomial-time. Similar to Figure 2 , let A 2 be the combination of S and A 1 (with renamed ports). S only substitutes messages between M 1 and A 1 , and does not change the scheduling.
We can now observe the following: First, if we can show that for the output b = v H ∧ ¬v A by M 2 , it is b = 1 with only negligible probability, then H's views when running with the real and the ideal protocol are indistinguishable, and thus (M 1 , S) ≥ poly sec (M 2 , S). Second, consider the definition of B. We can define B ′ completely analogous, using A 2 and M 2 instead of A 1 and M 1 . By noticing that H's answer to the puzzle is chosen before M 1 or M 2 outputs b, we see that B and B ′ have the same output distributions.
Let v A and v H denote the corresponding predicates calculated by M 2 in a run of the ideal protocol, where we set v A = ⊥ and v H = ⊥ if the respective variable predicate is never determined (this can happen only when no answer to the respective puzzle is made).
By (10), the following is negligible:
is overwhelming. Combining (17) and (16), we conclude that
are both overwhelming (consider that M 2 's output is b = 0 only if v H and v A are defined and ¬v H ∨ v A ). Using (15), we finally have that
is non-negligible. Since in the run of the real configuration conf c+1 1 , it is b = 0 with overwhelming probability, and b shows up in H c+1 's view, this is a contradiction to (14) and shows (M 1 , S) ≥ uni,poly sec (M 2 , S).
Conclusion
We have separated standard and universal simulatability in the case of computational and statistical security. This shows that these security notions are indeed different. However, it would be nice to know whether there is a less "artificial" separating example than ours. In particular, it is not clear whether there is a more "cryptographic" example. We have also shown that for perfect security, standard and universal simulatability coincide. This result may ease security proofs-showing standard simulatability automatically shows universal simulatability.
